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X Department Store advertises a bargain sale with siz-
able reductions in all of its prices. Plaintiff-housewife at-
tends at the advertised hour to find that a large crowd has
assembled at the entrance due to the delayed opening of the
doors. The size of the crowd and its impatience increase.
Plaintiff-housewife is pressed against the plate glass dis-
play windows which break under pressure and the plaintiff
is injured. Plaintiff-housewife sues X Department Store.
Though the occurrence of the above situation may not be
infrequent, appeals prosecuted to an appellate court are
scanty. Interesting questions are presented which have not
been determined with any satisfactory degree of finality by
the cases. Was X Department Store negligent, i.e. would
a reasonable man in the shoes of X Department Store have
foreseen risk to this plaintiff? If so, at what point in the
chain of events was the duty of reasonable care on the part
of the defendant violated? Should the defendant have reas-
onably anticipated the action of the crowd or was such action
an independent and intervening cause breaking the chain of
causation? Did the plaintiff assume the risk? What in-
structions are to be given the jury?
Reasonably diligent search reveals four cases directly in
point, one of which is quite recent,' which are conflicting
as to result and method. What may be said to be the lead-
ing case from the standpoint that it was one of the earliest
decided and is most frequently cited is that of Greeley v.
Miller's Inc.2 In this case the facts substantially parallel
those in the hypothetical case with the exception that the
defendant department store had employed two supernum-
erary policemen to prevent too many customers from enter-
ing at one time. The plaintiff waited approximately thirty
minutes for the store's opening beyond the advertised open-
ing time. As the crowd surged forward, the pressure
* 2d year law student, Duke University; A.B. Duke 1951.
1 240 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.Civ.App. 1951).
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against the display windows caused them to break and the
falling glass injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff made a
threefold claim of negligence on the part of'the defendant
department store: (1) that the defendant knew or should
have known that the advertisement would draw a large
number of people to the store and that so large a number
in the entrance, in close proximity to the plate glass win-
dows, might break them unless there were barriers of pro-
tection; (2) that the failure to open the doors at the speci-
fied hour caused the crowd to be restless thereby increasing
the danger; (3) that the defendant saw or should have seen
the crowd pressing, but despite this failed to open the doors
or to take any other measures to protect the prospective
customers from the danger of the breaking windows. In
the lower court a verdict was directed for the defendant
The appellate court reversed saying that the jury might
reasonably have found these additional facts: that the de-
fendant should have known that the late opening of the
store would increase the number of people waiting; that it
in fact knew or should have known that those in the en-
tranceway "could not well withstand the pressure of the
throng behind them or govern the direction in which they
went" ;3 that it knew or should have known that the windows
would break if subjected to severe pressure.
"Although the defendant knew or should have
known this condition, it failed to make any effort to
control the crowd or to open its doors and thus
avoid or lessen the danger liable to arise out of this
condition. The control of this situation was in its
own hands, and it failed entirely to exercise it in
a reasonable way.
' 4
The court seems to say here that the defendant should have
not only anticipated the crowd but also the risk of its actions
towards this class of plaintiffs. It held that if there were
no contributory negligence, the jury could have found the
negligence of the defendant to be the proximate cause of
the injury to the plaintiff. The court further indicated that
Supra, note 2 at 501.
Supra at note 3.
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the facts in evidence did not justify a conclusion of negli-
gence from the failure to barricade the windows.
An identical case, solely from the standpoint of the factual
situation, arose in Texas three years later in Rincon v. Berg
Co.5 There the plaintiff was injured under similar circum-
stances and made several allegations of the defendant's neg-
ligence. The case was submitted to the jury on twelve
special issues only one of which was relevant to the defend-
ant's negligence.
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence
it was negligent on the part of the said Berg Com-
pany to fail to have said windows boarded up or
take other precautions for the safety of parties
seeking to attend the sale then in progress?"O
The effect of the jury's verdict was that the accident was
not unavoidable and that the failure to board the windows
or take other precautions was negligence on the part of the
defendant. The trial judge rendered judgment n. o. v. for
the defendant. As only one issue was submitted, the ap-
pellate court did not discuss the defendant's contention of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff, as such, but confined its discussion to proximate cause.
Making reference to an evidently long-standing and revered
definition of proximate cause by an earlier Texas court, the
court continued,
"A party should not be held responsible for the con-
sequences of an act which ought not reasonably to
have been foreseen? In other words, it ought not
be deemed negligence to do or to fail to do an act
when it was not anticipated, and should not have
been anticipated, that it would result in injury to
anyone."7
Applying this to the case under consideration, the court
asked,
"Can it be said that the Berg Company could have
reasonably foreseen that, if it failed to board up
4 60 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.Civ.App. 1933).
6 Supra, note 5 at 813.
7 Supra, note 5 at 814.
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its display windows, a crowd would come to attend
the sale, the members of which would become so
impatient that they would push other members
against the display windows in the entrance, there-
by injuring them? We think not.' 8
The court distinguished the Greeley case on two grounds:
(1) that there was in that case a pleading of a failure to
open the doors in time and that the defendant failed to
open the doors after it saw the crowd pressing against the
windows (which was not alleged in the Rincon case); and
(2) that the court held there that the facts would not sup-
port a conclusion of the defendant's negligence on the fail-
ure to barricade alone. On that basis (as the failure to
barricade was the only issue submitted), the Rincon case
does not appear to be inconsistent with the Greeley case.
Still three years later in the District of Columbia came
the case of Schwartman v. Lloyd.9 There the plaintiff ar-
rived one half hour after the sale had started. A crowd had
gathered outside the defendant department store and cus-
tomers were being allowed to enter seven or eight at a time
by the defendant's agents. Each time there was a surge,
one of which cracked the display windows and pitched the
plaintiff forward on the ground cutting her legs. The re-
sulting disturbance caused premature birth of a child, at-
tempts at suicide, and confinement in a hospital and her home.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent and
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injury in that: (1) the defendant failed to protect the
windows when the defendant or its agents saw, or by the ex-
ercise of reasonable care could have seen the crowd pressing
against the display windows; (2) that the defendant failed
to prevent the breaking of the windows after it saw or by
the exercise of reasonable care should have seen the win-
dows breaking. There was no affirmative plea of defense
and the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied.
The reviewing court held for the plaintiff who relied a
great deal on the Greeley case. The defendant pointed out
Supra at note 7.
82 F.2d 822 (D.C.Cir. 1936).
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that the court there had rejected a conclusion of the defend-
ant's negligence on the issue of barricading the windows.
Said the court,
"But we think this statement, taken in connection
with the whole of the case, meant only that the fail-
ure to place barriers would not alone have justified
a conclusion of negligence if other reasonable
means to prevent injury had been used by the de-
fendant."10
The ground of the court's decision was not that it was neg-
ligence on the part of the department store to attract a
crowd to its store and it accordingly purported to lay down
no rule prohibiting these sales, but it based its decision on
the manner in which the attracted crowd was held and
handled. It held that evidence showing that the flow of
the crowd is dammed without warnings, barricades, or
guards was sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find
the defendant negligent.1
The most recent decision involving this situation was also
decided in Texas: Fair Stores v. Lane.12 The plaintiff broke
her leg under circumstances identical with the previous
cases. She alleged the defendant was negligent in eight
specific instances to which the defendant answered that the
injury was due to the action of third persons, the plaintiff's
negligence, and that the accident was unavoidable. Upon
submission of the case to the jury, the defendant was found
to have committed four acts of negligence which were the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury: (1) failure of the
defendant's agents to properly police the premises; (2) fail-
ure to open doors at the advertised time; (3) failure to rope
off the entrance; (4) and failure to have its agents police
and keep the crowd from pushing. Judgment was rendered
for the plaintiff. The appellate court reversed utilizing the
medium of proximate cause. The court purported to follow
the Rincon case indicating that the action of the crowd Was
a new and indepeident cause of the plaintiff's injuries. It
10 Suzpra, note 9 at 825.
SSupra, note 9 at 827.
12 Supra at note 1.
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concluded, "As far as this record is concerned, Mrs. Lane's
injuries are not the natural and probable result of the appel-
lant's negligent act or omission."'13 Again a court was called
on to consider the Greeley case. It was distinguished on the
ground that there the jury found that the defendant knew
or should have known that a disorderly crowd would press
the plaintiff against the door, or some other object, in such
a way as to break the plaintiff's leg whereas there was no
such finding in the case under consideration.14
Section 281 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts states
the elements of a cause of action for negligence:
"The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest
of another, if:
(a) the interest invaded is protected against unin-
tentional invasion, and
(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with re-
spect to such interest or any other similar in-
terest of the other which is protected against
unintentional invasion, and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the in-
vasion, and
(d) the other has not so conducted himself as to
disable himself from bringing an action for
such invasion."
The attempt to resolve the cases under consideration in
terms of legal or proximate causation merely serves to ob-
scure the real issues. Under the Restatement analysis the
only elements necessary to establish liability for negligence
which are genuinely in doubt are whether the defendant
was negligent and whether the plaintiff conducted himself,
or as is more typically the case, herself, so as to be unable
to maintain an action. There is no real question of legal
causation because if the defendant was negligent at all his
negligence consisted of creating an unreasonable risk of the
particular type of injury which the plaintiff sustained.Yr
3 Supra, note 1 at 377.
21 A dubious distinction in view of the verdict of the lower court in
this case.
13 See comment e to section 281 of the Restatement of Torts.
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When the injury which occurs is the particular hazard which
makes the defendant's conduct negligent, it is clear that it
must be aproximate consequence of such negligence. Other-
wise a court would be confronted with the anomalous situa-
tion of holding that the defendant was negligent because he
created the risk of a particular hazard, but that he was not
liable when the very injury which made his conduct negli-
gent actually eventuated.
In attempting to analyze whether the defendant has been
negligent in these cases it will be helpful to consider just
what the defendant did (or failed to do) which may be held
to have created an unreasonable risk of injury. Typically,
one of the plaintiff's allegations is that the defendant was
negligent in failing to open the doors at the advertised hour
with knowledge of the nature of the crowd gathered. It
would seem that something less than a reasonable man see-
ing the crowd jamming against the display windows, would
realize that by not opening the doors some one of its mem-
bers might be injured. The verdicts returned in these cases
sustain this contention. 16 The same factors seem to under-
lie allegations of the defendant's negligence in failing to
give some warning to the crowd or to have its agents police
the premises. At least, a jury question is presented. The
Lane case referred to the act of the crowd as the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The decision might better
be based on the negligence issue since proximate cause in
this type of case where the hazard which occurred was the
particular hazard which would have made the defendant's
conduct negligent is scarcely open to serious question.
However, whether failure to barricade the display win-
dows is negligence is another matter. All these cases hold
that this alone is insufficient evidence of a similarly situated
defendant's negligence. Such a conclusion appears sound
since risk to the plaintiff could be eliminated by proper
policing or less onerous means. Though a reasonable man
26 At this point the magnitude of the risk created must be weighed
against the social utility of the conduct of the defendant. It seems
reasonable to conclude that bargain sales in department stores are not
socially desirable to the extent that their privilege is complete.
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might foresee injury to someone in the crowd after it has
gathered and its conduct is such that a reasonable man
would take some affirmative steps to assure the safety of its
members, the courts have been unwilling to require the de-
fendant to barricade.17 The court in the Rincon case, pur-
porting to base its decision solely on the issue of barricading,
might have held as a matter of law that this was not negli-
gence and avoided the confusion of the new and independent
cause argument.
The plaintiff-hous6wife, then, would appear to make out
a case of actionable negligence providing she has not dis-
abled herself within the meaning of (d) under section 281
of the Restatement of Torts. The most probable bar to the
plaintiff's recovery would seem to be the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk,1s however, contributory negligence has
also been utilized by the defendant in these cases.19 The
former is based on the consent of the plaintiff and the only
possible basis for a reasonable contention that the plaintiff
in these cases gave her consent to relieve the defendant of
liability would be by implication from her conduct.
Schwartzman v. Lloyd held that "the public assumes the or-
dinary risks of ordinary crowds. '20 Generally, however,
there must be full knowledge and appreciation of the risk
and a voluntary encountering of it by the plaintiff.2 ' This
was not true in these cases.
Much of the confusion in these cases seems to have re-
sulted from a failure of the plaintiff attorneys to specifi-
cally indicate the defendant's negligence. The cases have
made a differentiation. To allege that the defendant was
negligent in failing to open its doors at the advertised hour,
in failing to warn and have its agents police the premises
17 Imagine the absurdity of requiring the store to secure boards and
a hammer when opening the door would alleviate the situation in a
simple manner.
" The facts of these cases suggest this doctrine as a more plausible
defense than that of contributory negligence.
10 Contributory negligence of the plaintiff was an affirmative plea of
defense in Rincon v. Berg Co. and Fair Stores v. Lane. As assumption
of risk is a facet of negligence, contributory negligence will be assumed
to have the same effect as assumption of risk.
20 Supra at note 11.
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without pointing out exactly when these failures were un-
reasonable is to invite a court to utilize the independent and
intervening cause argument. A defendant department store
should not be held to account for its failure to anticipate
this injury until a large restless crowd has gathered. At
that point it is not an unrealistic standard of care to require
such a defendant to take some affirmative steps to prevent
unnecessary threat of harm to a plaintiff so situated. Plead-
ings and proof in accordance with this make it difficult for a
reviewing court to manipulate proximate cause in such a
manner as to release the defandant from liability, for the
nature and the actions of the crowd are part of the sur-
rounding circumstances that the defendant, as a reasonable
man, is bound to take into account. This is a fair inference
from the cases adjudicated.
